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INTRODUCTION: RECONSIDERING
THE TAX TREATY
Steven A. Dean* & Rebecca M. Kysar‡
or nearly one hundred years, the international tax re-
gime steadfastly pursued a single nemesis, double taxa-
tion. States armed themselves against this common enemy with
their weapon of choice, the double tax treaty. Nearly uniform in
language and approach, the treaties proliferated to more than
three thousand in number,1 resulting in a secure arrangement
between and among states and taxpayers.
Yet in recent years, states have had to expand the war to mul-
tiple fronts in the face of globalization, technological changes,
evolving taxpayer abuses, and shifts in both domestic and inter-
national political pressures. For instance, a growing recognition
that the interests of a state and its taxpayers can and do diverge
has fueled the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) contain-
ment effort led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), culminating in an unprecedented
multilateral instrument. Acknowledging that tax havens lack
some combination of the resources and the inclination to fore-
stall tax evasion, the U.S. Congress enacted the Foreign Account
Tax Compliance Act to compel financial institutions in foreign
jurisdictions to step into the breach,2 resulting in more than one
hundred intergovernmental agreements implementing new re-
porting regimes.3 The European Commission is currently inves-
tigating whether favorable advance transfer pricing rulings
granted to corporate taxpayers by certain European countries
violate the European Union bar on state aid that distorts com-
petition.4 These state aid cases have created tension among the
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1. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], ADDRESSING BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 8 (2013).
2. See I.R.C. §§ 1471–74 (enlisting foreign banks as informants).
3. See Resource Center: Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),
TREASURY.GOV, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/trea-
ties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
4. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S RECENT
STATE AID INVESTIGATIONS OF TRANSFER PRICING RULES 1–2 (2016). Among
these are investigations regarding Apple and Ireland, Starbucks and the Neth-
erlands, Fiat and Luxembourg, and Amazon and Luxembourg. Id. at 2–3.
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various jurisdictions that have a claim in taxing profits that
have been shifted to tax havens and have the potential to unset-
tle dispute resolution procedures under bilateral tax treaties.5
Whether these developments indicate a rupture of the inter-
national tax regime or instead herald its repair is a subject of
debate within the tax law community. The articles in this issue
grapple with the regime’s destabilization and draw what per-
haps may be best described as “across the spectrum” conclusions.
Important among these, of course, are the implications for the
archetypal double tax treaty itself.
At a fundamental level, the viability of the international tax
regime might be judged by its fidelity to the concept at the core
of the tax treaty: the single tax principle. Encouragingly,
Shaviro probes the single tax principle—which allocates income
among states to ensure that income is taxed neither more nor
less than once—and finds that what appears to be a rule might
be better thought of as a standard. As described in The Two
Faces of the Single Tax Principle, rather than offering the preci-
sion of a fifty-five miles per hour speed limit, the single tax prin-
ciple merely urges states to avoid both excessively taxing cross-
border transactions and cavalierly allowing income to escape
taxation completely. Shaviro notes that the plasticity of the
standard accommodates an understandable degree of ambiva-
lence regarding the single tax principle. States may tolerate—or
even facilitate—the avoidance of other states’ taxes,6 and their
competitive instincts “frequently outweigh the urge to maximize
domestic tax revenue . . . .”7 His conclusion suggests that the
single tax principle may be robust enough to embrace the imper-
fect states it seeks to serve.
Operationalizing the single tax principle will, nevertheless, be
challenging. Kane takes a fresh look at the problem of allocating
taxing jurisdiction and hits the reset button by shifting focus
from intellectual property to labor. Location Savings and Seg-
mented Factor Input Markets: In Search of a Tax Treaty Solution
observes that the embattled arm’s length method fails to provide
reliable answers even when the puzzle presented by intangibles
5. See id. at 19–23.
6. See Daniel Shaviro, The Two Faces of the Single Tax Principle, 41
BROOK. J. INT’LL. 1293, 1301 (2016) (noting U.S. willingness to “tolerate[] U.S.
companies’ use of check-the-box rules to avoid subpart F’s checks on the avoid-
ance of other countries’ taxes.”).
7. Id. at 1299.
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can be put aside. Considering a pair of possible solutions to the
questions raised by labor rents, Kane demonstrates that the
headwinds faced by the treaty-based international tax regime
neither begin nor end with intangibles. No less important, Kane
shows the importance of being willing to question even our most
basic assumptions about how the international tax regime—
both at the conceptual level, with the arm’s length principal,8
and at the practical level, with the treaty notion of a permanent
establishment9—can and should operate.
In Tax Treaties and the Taxation of Services in the Absence of
Physical Presence, Kirsch offers an additional note of caution,
suggesting that, even in the rarified world of international tax,
the road to hell can be paved with good intentions. Kirsch
demonstrates that a U.N. effort to adapt its model to ensure an
appropriate allocation of taxing jurisdiction by preventing profit
shifting by multinationals would unintentionally cloud the tax
consequences of activities ranging from cutting-edge telesurgery
to legal advice to foreign visitors. As Kirsch describes it, efforts
to modernize the international tax regime seem uncomfortably
like installing self-driving technology in a vintage Model T.10
Such challenges can inspire unconventional but potent solu-
tions. Cooperation can be difficult to achieve among heterogene-
ous states. With “Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty” Revisited,
Rosenzweig evokes the international trade concept of cross-re-
taliation under the World Trade Organization, in which states
gain permission to apply pressure to an adversary’s vulnerable
spots with, what might be termed, “cross-cooperation.” Recogniz-
ing that states have different tastes in carrots just as they fear
different sticks, Rosenzweig envisions a post-bilateral tax treaty
8. See Mitchell A. Kane, Location Savings and Segmented Factor Input
Markets: In Search of a Tax Treaty Solution, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1107, 1113–
14 (2016) (proposing that “arm’s length transfer pricing in the case of location
savings ought to proceed by compensating local affiliates (where savings are
realized) by reference to comparables based on the market of the purchaser of
the input rather than the seller of the input.”).
9. Id. at 1115 (noting that “everybody tends to take the extent of source tax
of the nonresident party as a fixed point (established by Article 5)” of the OECD
Model, which outlines the rules on permanent establishment).
10. See Michael S. Kirsch, Tax Treaties and the Taxation of Services in the
Absence of Physical Presence, 41 BROOK. J. INT’LL. 1143, 1143 (2016) (observing
that “modern technological developments have strained long-standing interna-
tional tax policies and principles. Tax treaties have attempted to keep pace by
fitting these new developments within the existing framework.”).
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regime with sufficient flexibility to allow states to trade mis-
matched favors. BEPS, as he notes, represents an opportunity
for such an asymmetric system of cooperation to replace the rigid
mirroring of the existing framework.11
Charting a route no less radical, Marian advocates a reconcep-
tualization of state intervention against taxpayer (and state)
abuse of tax treaties. Unilateral Responses to Tax Treaty Abuse:
A Functional Approach offers a matrix aligning the scope and
scale of malfeasance with fitting responses ranging from tar-
geted kill-switch mechanisms in particular treaties to the com-
prehensive renegotiation of each and every node in a state’s
treaty network.12 In that framework, treaty termination be-
comes an intermediate response suitable for profound but
clearly circumscribed failures.
Echoing both Shaviro andMarian’s confidence that the trusted
building blocks of the international tax regime have the resili-
ence needed to meet today’s challenges, Shaheen offers an en-
couraging perspective on the future of tax treaties.How Reform-
Friendly Are U.S. Tax Treaties? argues that a range of recently
proposed reforms of the U.S. international tax rules embrace the
spirit, if not the letter, of U.S. tax treaty obligations. Shaheen
then demonstrates how these reforms can be tweaked to satisfy
even formalist interpretations of treaty obligations.13
Focusing on provisions of the new U.S. Model Tax treaty that
condition host-state concessions on a home-state tax burden,
Christians and Ezenagu extrapolate possible futures of the in-
ternational tax regime. Their vision highlights the swirling cur-
rents shaping today’s tax landscape. Concern regarding tax com-
petition among states lies near the surface of the “kill-switches”
they describe. Christians and Ezenagu speculate that domestic
11. See AdamH. Rosenzweig, “Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty”Revisited,
41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1229, 1230–31 (2016) (“The BEPS Action Plan represents
a truly revolutionary and groundbreaking effort to reform the international tax
regime; in fact, it is the first attempt to revisit the fundamental building blocks
of the international tax regime since its emergence in the early 1920s.”).
12. See Omri Marian, Unilateral Responses to Tax Treaty Abuse: A Func-
tional Approach, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1157, 1177 (2016).
13. See Fadi Shaheen, How Reform-Friendly Are U.S. Tax Treaties?, 41
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1243, 1271 (2016) (“[I]f we must worry about formalism in
applying treaty provisions, any exemption system could be easily structured
and drafted in a manner that the disallowance of credit for foreign taxes on
U.S.-exempt foreign-source income is reached through an exemption basket
mechanism (which is but a treaty-compatible limitation on cross crediting).”).
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political concerns beyond protection of the fisc—political grid-
lock and the outsized influence of transnational ventures—lurk
further below. Tracing the history of such mechanisms, Kill-
Switches in the U.S. Model Tax Treaty contrasts these innova-
tions against their conceptual predecessors. Thoughtfully and
thoroughly, they question whether these innovations represent
an embrace or a refutation of the single tax principal.14
Brauner indicts BEPS as a disappointingly conservative re-
sponse to the stateless income scandal that followed on the heels
of the 2008 financial crisis.15 Its fifteen action items underscore
the gap between the enormous magnitude of the threat and the
scope and scale of the response. Obviously, the architects of the
international tax regime could not have envisioned the ascend-
ance of intellectual property and its outsized role in modern eco-
nomic life. That their near-century-old regime fails to provide
principles robust enough to prevent ubiquitous tax avoidance by
sophisticated multinational enterprises should not surprise an-
yone. Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS laments—and method-
ically catalogues—the failures of BEPS to articulate modern
principles capable of narrowing the distance between the aging
international tax regime’s goals and its reach.
Dagan presents a dispiritingly plausible explanation for the ti-
midity of the BEPS proposals.16 Tax Treaties as a Network Prod-
uct observes that the international tax regime, and the treaties
that give it shape, exhibit the classic characteristic of a network
product: gaining strength by being strong. While the rise of
BEPS suggests a window has opened to create a better interna-
tional tax regime, she notes that the current regime favors states
with the greatest global influence (and the loudest voices in the
BEPS process). The alternative standard she calls for would re-
verse that trend, shifting the balance away from the global one
percent and toward everyone else.
14. See Allison Christians & Alexander Ezenagu, Kill-Switches in the U.S.
Model Tax Treaty, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1043, 1070–73 (2016).
15. See generally Yariv Brauner, Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS, 41
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 973 (2016).
16. See Tsilly Dagan, Tax Treaties as a Network Product, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 1081, 1104 (2016) (“[T]he BEPS initiative could prove to be a decisive mo-
ment in the history of international taxation: as it would offer a more compre-
hensive standard for international tax policy. The BEPS solution, however,
does not seem to be comprehensive enough to streamline the entire interna-
tional tax regime, nor does the BEPS report pay special attention to consider-
ations of justice.”).
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Looking beyond the surface to find an explanation for counter-
intuitive state action—and inaction—Ring paints an unfamiliar,
yet all-too-recognizable, portrait of states as they participate in
the international tax regime. Under pressure from a range of in-
terest groups and political pressures not traditionally taken into
account in the narrative of state action in the international tax
regime—the “ever-present constraint of democracy at home”17—
states can ultimately fall short on their international tax com-
mitments. When International Tax Agreements Fail at Home: A
U.S. Example provides a clear roadmap for scholars and policy
makers struggling to make sense of a world in which states fail
to act in line with settled expectations.
To conclude, states now find themselves confronting both com-
plex internal politics and skepticism from counterparts. Were a
cascade of technological change and a wave of public anger over
a perceived lack of accountability not enough to disrupt a cen-
tury of stability, the realization that trusted allies at home and
abroad blithely pursue their own agendas intensifies the threat.
The perspectives and insights offered here by leading tax schol-
ars offer hope that the international tax regime, and perhaps
even tax treaties themselves, can emerge stronger from the cur-
rent period of instability.
17. Diane Ring, When International Tax Agreements Fail at Home: A U.S.
Example, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1185, 1190 (2016).
